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THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990
AND THE 1993 AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
CAN SYSTEMIC ILLS AFFLICTING THE
FEDERAL COURTS BE REMEDIED BY
LOCAL RULES?
EDWARD D. CAVANAGH*
INTRODUCTION
The federal civil justice system is in serious, if not critical,
condition. There is a general consensus that federal litigation is
unduly expensive and takes too long, and that many matters sim-
ply do not belong in federal court.' Moreover, many thoughtful
observers agree that these problems are caused largely by the fol-
lowing: an inadequate number of federal judgeships; 2 the failure
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. A.B. summa cum laude
1971, University of Notre Dame; J.D. with Distinction 1974, Cornell Law School;
L.L.M. 1986, J.S.D. 1988, Columbia Law School.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. 1161, 1173 n.12 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(noting adverse effects of criminal mega-trial on judge's civil docket); FINAL REPORT TO
HONORABLE THOMAS C. PLATT, CHIEF JUDGE, PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT OF 1990, CONCERNING THE CAUSES OF UNNECESSARY DELAY AND EXPENSE IN CIVIL
LITIGATION IN THE EASTERN DisTRcT OF NEW YORK; U.S. DIsT. CT. FOR THE E. DIST OF
N.Y., reprinted in 142 F.R.D. 185, 189-90 (1991) [hereinafter EDNY REPORT]; Thomas
D. Rowe, Jr., AL.I. Study on Paths to a "Better Way": Litigation, Alternatives, and
Accommodation: Background Paper, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 825 ("ITlhe levels of discon-
tent and controversy about disputing and dispute processing seem quite high."); Jon
0. Newman, Comment, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process,
94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1644 (1985) ("[Tlhere can be little doubt that the system is not
working very well. Too many cases take too much time to be resolved and impose too
much cost upon litigants and taxpayers alike."); PRESIDENT's COUNCIL ON COMPETI-
TIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 3 (1991) ("The current pro-
cedural system adds costs by prolonging resolution of disputes and encouraging
wasteful litigation.").
2 Congress, having increased the number of federal judgeships under the Federal
Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. II, 104 Stat. 5089, 5098 (1990), is not
likely to create additional judgeships in the near term. Two of the more intriguing and
controversial proposals for increasing the amount ofjudge time devoted to civil cases
have emanated from California. The Central District of California Advisory Group
has proposed that its court be split into criminal and civil divisions, with civil division
judges assigned only civil cases and criminal division judges assigned only criminal
cases. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DIsTRICT COURT FOR
THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF
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to fill existing vacancies promptly; the Speedy Trial Act, which
gives priority to criminal cases over civil cases; the Sentencing
Guidelines, which limit judicial discretion in sentencing thereby
discouraging plea bargaining; and the federalization of criminal
law enforcement. There is, however, less of a consensus on how
to deal with these problems, and finger-pointing abounds-judges
blame lawyers, lawyers blame judges, the defense bar blames
plaintiffs, and vice versa.4
Congress has responded to the crisis in the federal courts with
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 ("CJRA).5 At the same time,
the judiciary proposed major reforms through the 1993 Amend-
1990, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE CENT. DIST. OF CAL. 65-68 (1991) [hereinafter C.D. CAL.
REPORT]. The Southern District of California has recommended that each judge
within the district, on a two month rotating basis, hear only civil matters. REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN Dis-
TRICT OF CALIFORNIA As REQUIRED BY THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990; U.S.
DIST. CT. FOR THE S. DIST. OF CAL. 4, 14 (1991) ("Biden Bill").
3 See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PATENT LAw REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRE-
TARY OF COMMERCE 94-95 (1992) [PATENT LAW REFORM]. The Commission reported:
The Speedy Trial Act, which ensures criminal defendants of a speedy
disposition of criminal indictments, has had a significant impact on civil liti-
gation. This Act is frequently cited as being a primary reason for the inter-
ruptions and concomitant delays in civil litigation. The impact of these inter-
ruptions on complex proceedings such as patent disputes can be extremely
costly, and can contribute to delays in reaching an eventual outcome of the
litigation.
Possible solutions to the problems caused by the Speedy Trial Act in-
clude segregation of civil and criminal litigation into discrete courts, im-
provements in scheduling and case management, and expansion of judicial
resources to manage civil and criminal litigation. One clearly undesirable
trend has been the recent tendency of Congress to expand the scope of crimi-
nal jurisdiction of the Federal district courts. This has led to further clogging
of the single docket system in the Federal courts.
Id.; see EDNY REPORT, supra note 1, at 199-213; see also C.D. CAL. REPORT, supra
note 2, at 33-43 (citing heavy criminal caseloads and failure to fill judicial vacancies
promptly as causes of excessive delay).
4 See, e.g., Paul L. Friedman, Speeding Up Justice at the District Court, LEGAL
TIMES, Apr. 19, 1993, at 30-31 (identifying tactics of lawyers and judges that cause
unnecessary delay).
5 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 1992). The Civil Justice Reform Act addresses
the dual problems of cost and delay in federal civil litigation. It is believed that these
problems inhibit the full and accurate determination of the facts and interfere with
the deliberate and prompt disposition and adjudication of cases. S. REP. No. 416,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6808-09. The
legislation purports "to promote for all citizens ... the just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolution of civil disputes in our nation's federal courts." Id. at 1, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6804.
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ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 These two ap-
proaches address the perceived ills of the federal civil litigation
system in markedly different ways. The 1993 Amendments seek
to effectuate change through national rules applicable throughout
the federal system, whereas the CJRA attempts to improve fed-
eral litigation practices at the local level by requiring each district
to identify and address particular problems that have beset that
district and to propose specifically tailored solutions. In short, the
CJRA contemplates reform from the bottom up, through local
rules, while the 1993 Amendments attempt to achieve reform
from the top down, through national rules.
This Article examines and analyzes (1) the wisdom of address-
ing pervasive problems in the federal civil practice system
through local rules and (2) the likely combined impact of the
CJRA and the 1993 Amendments on litigation in the federal
courts. As discussed below, the plans to be implemented in each
district pursuant to the CJRA will engraft yet another layer of lo-
cal rules on top of a system that is already saturated with rules.
Plans currently in effect in some districts have already generated
much confusion and uncertainty among members of both the
bench and bar. The confusion and uncertainty are heightened by
the overlay of the 1993 Amendments, which in some instances
provide standards at variance with those embodied in CJRA
plans. This collision of two different regulatory schemes threatens
to impair any meaningful procedural reform in the federal litiga-
tion system for years to come.
I. BACKGROUND: THE CJRA
The CJRA, sometimes referred to as the "Biden Bill," was
signed into law by President Bush on December 1, 1990, as part of
the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. 7 It was enacted with little
fanfare-the product of an eleventh-hour compromise consum-
mated in the waning hours of the 101st Congress. The CJRA is
the outgrowth of a 1989 study by a joint task force from the Brook-
6 H.R. Doc. No. 74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 98-110 (1993), reprinted in 113 S. Ct.
orders 475 (1993). This approach is not without its critics. Justice Scalia argues that
the amendments will increase litigation costs and burden the federal courts. Id. at
105-10, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. orders 581.
7 Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482
(Supp. 1992).
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ings Institute and the Foundation for Change,' which concluded
that the costs of litigation in the federal system have become un-
reasonably high, thereby effectively limiting access to the courts
to deep-pocket litigants.9
Responding to the Brookings study, Senator Biden and others
introduced legislation on January 21, 1990 which would have rad-
ically altered the face of federal civil litigation. 10 Among other
things, Biden's bill, as initially drafted, would have implemented
a civil analogue to the federal Speedy Trial Act." It would have
required that each district court implement procedures containing
the following provisions: (1) separate tracks for differing types of
cases; (2) mandatory discovery conferences within 45 days of the
response to the complaint to be chaired by a judge, not a magis-
trate judge; (3) staged resolution of issues; (4) setting of a trial
date within 45 days of the response of the complaint; (5) presump-
tive time limits for the completion of discovery; and (6) expanded
judicial training program emphasizing case management.' 2 The
bill was widely criticized by the federal judiciary and practition-
ers,' 3 thereafter redrafted, and later enacted in its present form.
8 See BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAYS IN
CIVIL LITIGATION (1989), reprinted in The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 6 (1990). The Brookings Institute Task Force was con-
vened at Chairman Biden's request. It included: "leading litigators from the plaintiffs'
and defense bar, civil and women's rights lawyers, attorneys representing consumer
and environmental organizations, representatives of the insurance industry, general
counsels of major corporations, former judges and law professors." R. Lawrence Des-
sem, Judicial Reporting Under the Civil Justice Reform Act: Look, Mon, No Cases!, 54
U. PITT. L. REv. 687, 690 n.13 (1993).
9 JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 8, at 6, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 8, app.
10 See S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6805. Co-sponsors included Senators Thurmond, Metzenbaum,
Heflin, Kohl, Simon, and Specter. Id.
11 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3175 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
12 28 U.S.C. § 479 (Supp. 1992).
13 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice
Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1283, 1285, 1314 (1993); Vic-
toria Slind-Flor, Drug-War Gripes Set The Mood 9th Circuit Meeting, NATL L.J., July
2, 1990, at 2 ("Judges and lawyers alike said that they could see little sense in the
Civil Justice Reform Act sponsored by [Senator Biden]."); Richard A. Rothman, Civil
Justice Reform Act: Too Little, Too Fast, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 1990, at 2; Stephen
Labaton, Business and the Law Biden's Challenge to the Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 16, 1990, at D2 ("[A]lmost all of the judges are against it."); Ann Pelham, Judges
Bristle at Biden's Civil Reform Plan, LEGAL TIMEs, Mar. 5, 1990, at 1 ("They're out of
touch with the real world' says one judge bitterly. 'We were never consulted at all.'").
[Vol. 67:721
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Practices and procedures which had been mandatory in the earlier
version of the bill became discretionary in the bill as enacted.
A. Mandates Under the CJRA
The CJRA is the first statutorily-mandated attempt to ex-
amine at the grass roots level the functioning of the federal civil
justice system on a nationwide basis.1 4 It requires each of the
ninety-four federal district courts to form an advisory group to as-
sess the state of the civil and criminal dockets in its district, and
to report to the chief judge the causes of unnecessary delay and
expense in civil cases, 15 along with proposals for remedial ac-
tion.16 After reviewing the report of its advisory group, the court
in each district is then required to promulgate a civil expense and
delay reduction plan, which may or may not follow the advisory
group recommendations.' 7 All courts must have a plan in effect
by December 1, 1993.' s Ten courts, known collectively as pilot dis-
tricts, were required to implement a plan by no later than Decem-
ber 31, 1991.19 Other courts, known as early implementation dis-
tricts, were permitted to have plans in effect by January 1, 1992.20
14 See Dessem, supra note 8, at 687. On the local level, the Eastern District of
New York has undertaken a similar endeavor for nearly a decade. EDNY REPORT,
supra note 1, at 195.
15 In identifying the principal causes of cost and delay, the Advisory Group is to
"giv[el consideration to such potential causes as court procedures and the ways in
which litigants and their attorneys approach and conduct litigation...." 28 U.S.C.
§ 472(c)(1)(C) (Supp. 1992).
16 In addition to "determin[ing] the condition of the civil and criminal dockets"
and "identify[ing] the principal causes of cost and delay in civil litigation," the advi-
sory group is directed to "identify trends in case filings and in the demands being
placed on the court's resources" and "examine the extent to which costs and delays
could be reduced by a better assessment of the impact of new legislation on the
courts." 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1) (Supp. 1992).
17 28 U.S.C. § 472(b) (Supp. 1992).
18 Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(b), 104 Stat. 5089, 5096.
19 Id. § 105, 104 Stat. at 5097. The CJRA directs the Judicial Conference to desig-
nate the ten pilot districts. These ten districts are: S.D. Cal., D. Del., N.D. Ga.,
S.D.N.Y., D. Okla., E.D. Pa., W.D. Tenn., S.D. Tex., D. Utah, and E.D. Wis. JuDicL.L
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, DEvELoP1%'ENT OF PLANs By EARLY IMPLEMENTA-
TION DisTicTs AND PILOT CouRTs (1992).
20 Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(c), 104 Stat. 5096 (1990) as amended Pub. L. No.
102-572, tit. V, § 505, 106 Stat. 4513 (1992). A district court is designated an Early
Implementation District ("EID") if it develops and implements a civil justice expense
and delay reduction plan no earlier than six months and no later than twelve months
after the CJRA's effective date. Id. This designation aims to encourage district courts
and advisory groups to implement their plans with all deliberate speed without forc-
ing them to move so rapidly that the spirit of the Act is undermined. S. REP. No. 416,
supra note 5, at 64, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.4N. at 6853. In addition to the ten
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In formulating its plan, each court must consider and may in-
clude the following concepts:21
1. Systematic, differential treatment of civil cases which tai-
lor the level of judicial management to the needs of the case;
2. Early, ongoing control of the pretrial process by the judi-
cial officer;
3. Use of case management conferences in complex cases to
(a) explore settlement possibilities; (b) identify disputed is-
sues; (c) schedule discovery; and (d) set deadlines for motions;
4. Encouragement of cost-effective discovery through volun-
tary exchange of information;
5. Requiring that no discovery motion can be entertained
unless the parties have first made a good faith effort to re-
solve their differences; and
6. Authorization to refer appropriate cases to alternative
dispute resolution.22
After the plan is approved by the district court, it is further
reviewed by a committee consisting of the chief judge of the circuit
and the chief judges of each district court within that circuit.23
That committee may suggest additional actions or recommend
modifications to the plan.24 The plan is also reviewed by the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States which is empowered to re-
quest a particular district to alter or amend its plan if the Confer-
ence determines that a district court has not adequately
responded to the demands and conditions of its civil and criminal
dockets, or to the recommendations of its advisory group. 25 In ad-
pilot districts, Early Implementation Districts include the following 24 districts: D.
Alaska, E.D. Ark., E.D. Cal., S.D. Fla., D. Idaho, S.D. Ill., N.D. Ind., S.D. Ind., D.
Kan., D. Mass., W.D. Mich., D. Mont., D.N.J., E.D.N.Y., D. Ohio, D. Or., E.D. Tex.,
D.V.I., E.D. Va., N.D. W.Va., S.D. W.Va., W.D. Wis., and D. Wyo. JuDIcIAL CONFER-
ENCE, supra note 19.
21 28 U.S.C. § 473(a). The six principles embodied in § 473(a) are aimed at: defin-
ing the issues to be litigated and limiting pretrial activity to relevant matters; control-
ling pretrial discovery and other activity to avoid unnecessary expense and burden;
arriving at a settlement in appropriate cases as early as possible or attempting to
identify methods for resolving it as expeditiously and economically as possible; facili-
tating an adjudication on the merits in appropriate cases; and ensuring that any trial
will be well focused and well prepared. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 5, at 57, reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6846.
22 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (Supp. 1992).
23 28 U.S.C. § 474(a)(1) (Supp. 1992).
24 Id.
25 Id. 474(b); see S. REP. No. 416, supra note 5, at 59, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6848.
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dition to involvement in the review process, the Judicial Confer-
ence has in fact promulgated a Model Plan.26
The CJRA also requires that once a plan is in place, the court,
consulting with its advisory group, must assess it annually.27
Thus, the statute contemplates ongoing oversight of the plan and
amendment where appropriate. Pursuant to the Act, the Judicial
Conference, with the Federal Judicial Center and the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts, must also report on all
plans by December 1, 1994.28 To this end, the RAND Corporation
has been retained to assist in a comparative analysis of plans im-
plemented in various districts. By these measures, Congress has
indicated that it clearly expects results from the adoption of dis-
trict-by-district plans. If tangible improvements in the problem of
cost and delay are not achieved, Congress could choose to pursue
more draconian measures upon the sunset of the CJRA in 1995.
B. Authority of the CJRA Plan
The plans promulgated pursuant to the CJRA function as de
facto local rules.29 Therefore, in order to ascertain the governing
procedural rules of the district in which their case is venued, at-
torneys and their clients must not only be aware of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, local rules, standing orders, and a
judge's individual rules, but the district's expense and delay re-
duction plan as well. This creates three significant problems for
litigants and their counsel. First, litigants must determine the
26 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MODEL CIVIL JUSTICE DELAY AND
EXPENSE REDUCTION PLAN (1992) [hereinafter MODEL PLAN].
27 28 U.S.C. § 475 (Supp. 1992). This is done to determine appropriate additional
actions that may be taken by the court to reduce cost and delay in civil litigation and
to improve the litigation management practices of the court. Id.
28 Id. § 471(a).
29 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. 1992). The CJRA does not explicitly state that plan pro-
visions will trump inconsistent provisions of the local rules and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, a fair reading of § 473 would maintain the validity of
any plan that conforms to the principles and guidelines set forth in the Act in the face
of a conflicting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. The drafters of the 1993 Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sought to avoid the problem of conflict by
explicitly authorizing local variations pursuant to CJRA plans. See FED. R. Crw. P. 26
advisory committee note. Conflict between the plans and local rules should not occur.
Presumably, the Advisory Group in each district has reviewed the local rules prior to
proposing a plan. Any local rules in conflict with the plan should then simply be
abrogated.
1993]
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content of the plan in effect in that district.3 0 That is no easy task.
Many districts adopted their plans on or near the December 1,
1993 deadline. At least initially, these plans have been available
only through the promulgating district court. Despite recently im-
proved accessibility of plans, for instance, through Westlaw, some
information gap regarding the content of various plans still exists
and results in an increase in transactional costs to ascertain the
status and contents of plans in various districts.
Second, and more important, the CJRA, by encouraging local
experimentation, has already spawned procedures which vary
from court to court, thereby Balkanizing federal practice, and is
likely to spawn even more variations in practice as more plans are
implemented and refined. This arguably undermines the funda-
mental premise of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-uniform-
ity of procedures and practices within the federal court system-
and forces parties again to incur unnecessary transaction costs by
necessitating use of local counsel and further training of retained
counsel. Supporters of the CJRA acknowledge the potential for
variation from court to court but urge that local experimentation
is a healthy exercise which will encourage new approaches to the
problems afflicting the federal civil justice system."' In the long
run, they argue, the worthwhile procedures will be widely adopted
and the failed experiments will be forgotten, thereby encouraging
uniformity.2 In the short run, however, this new layer of rules
has led to confusion and uncertainty.
Third, the proliferation of various plans has further compli-
cated the process of forum selection. No longer is the litigant
faced with a simple choice between federal and state court or be-
tween a convenient and less convenient federal venue. The con-
tent of a particular district's plan must be considered before opt-
ing for a specific forum. For example, does the plan feature
mandatory disclosure? Does the plan significantly limit discov-
30 A search of Westlaw's CJRA database revealed that at least 45 plans are in
effect.
31 A recent blue-ribbon commission study reform of patent law recognized that,
while variations in local rules may be justified, "such variations should be restricted
to those matters for which there is a clear local need." PATErr LAI REFORM, supra
note 3, at 85. The Commission further observed: "Inconsistencies in rules of practice
between the different federal district courts introduces unnecessary transactional
costs through the need for local counsel and additional training of retained counsel."
Id.; A.B.A. Conference on Civil Justice Reform Act, San Francisco California, Aug. 9,
1992 (remarks of Jeff Peck).
32 PATENT LAw REFORM, supra note 3, at 85.
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ery? Is court-annexed mediation required? Without knowing the
answers to these questions (and others), it is impossible to develop
a strategic plan for the litigation prior to filing. Obviously, one
familiar with the CJRA and the plans thereunder has a leg up on
a less informed adversary.
These practical difficulties created by the CJRA, however,
may only be manifestations of deeper problems caused by the
grassroots approach to procedural reform. Professor Linda Mul-
lenix, while recognizing that "[ait the most pragmatic level, the
grassroots local advisory groups are destined to create problem-
atic local rules, measures, and programs,"3" identifies a much
more fundamental concern with the CJRA. She views the act as
effectuating a "revolutionary redistribution of the procedural
rulemaking power from the federal judicial branch to the legisla-
tive branch." 4 The end result, she contends, "transform[s] the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules into a quaint, third-branch
vestigial organ." "
33 Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MMN.
L. REv. 375, 379 (1992). Professor Mullenix states:
The central importance of the Civil Justice Reform Act is this: the Act
has effected a revolutionary redistribution of the procedural rulemaking
power from the federal judicial branch to the legislative branch. Congress
has taken procedural rulemaking power away from judges and their expert
advisors and delegated it to local lawyers. By the expedient of declaring pro-
cedural rules to be substantive law, Congress has effectively repealed the
Rules Enabling Act. Congress has by fiat stripped the judicial branch of a
power that uniquely bears on the judicial function: the power to prescribe
internal rules of procedure for the federal courts. By legislative stealth in
enacting the Civil Justice Reform Act, Congress is continuing to transform
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules into a quaint, third-branch vestigial
organ.
The implications of this unheralded revolution will be dramatic and
widespread for years to come. At the most pragmatic level, the grassroots
local advisory groups are destined to create problematic local rules, meas-
ures, and programs. Although this "bottom up" approach to rulemaking is
theoretically laudable, it can also be viewed as a politically cynical way of
magically conferring a democratic patina on a rulemaking process that is not
truly locally inspired, but federally orchestrated by Washington. Further-
more, local amateur rulemaking groups, however intelligent, diligent, and
well-intentioned, are ill-equipped to perform the basic tasks the Act re-
quires, such as conducting docket assessments and evaluating the reasons
for cost and delay in the district. Bad social science will form the basis for
bad rulemaking.
Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. Mullenix anticipates a decrease in the advisory committee's influence on
the rule-making process for reasons unrelated to the CJRA. See Linda S. Mullenix,
1993]
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Professor Mullenix's conclusion that Congress has in fact
wrestled away from the judiciary the power to make rules of pro-
cedure and practice in the federal courts may be premature. First,
Congress has always had a say in the making of Federal Rules,
since even rules promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling
Act 3 6 can be modified or vetoed by Congress. Second, Congress
has traditionally legislated in areas which may be deemed areas of
practice and procedure. 7 In short, the courts and the legislature
have a broad area of concurrent jurisdiction when regulating prac-
tice and procedure in the federal courts. With the enactment of
the CJRA, Congress has clearly expressed its dissatisfaction with
the current state of affairs in the federal civil justice system.
Although some commentators might consider this step bold, it is
too soon to declare the judiciary a "vestigial" organ in the realm of
rulemaking.
Professor Mullenix, nevertheless, is correct in questioning the
wisdom of the CJRA's grassroots approach at a time when major
changes to national rules have been adopted by the Supreme
Court. It is by no means clear that the path to true reform in the
federal system lies in local rules and procedures established by
CJRA plans.
II. DOES ANOTHER LAYER OF LocAL RULES MAKE SENSE?
Local rules have always played a prominent role in governing
practice and procedure in federal court. Prior to the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, practice and proce-
dure in the federal system was governed by the Conformity Act
which mandated that a federal court follow the procedural rules of
the state in which it sits. 38 On the equity side, Congress had
adopted uniform rules of practice and procedure as early as
1842.11 Even under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, local
rules are specifically authorized. Rule 83 permits promulgation of
local rules of practice and procedure provided they do not conflict
Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rule Mak-
ing, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 797-802 (1991).
36 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
37 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (venue); Id. § 1404 (forum non con-
veniens); Id. § 1407 (judicial panel for multidistrict litigation).
38 Conformity Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 197; Rev. Stat. § 914.
39 See 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE § 1201, note 4 (1990) (noting that equity rules of 1842 and 1912 provided mod-
em system of pleading).
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with the Federal Rules.4" Thus, the drafters of the Federal Rules
contemplated that various districts might choose to adopt local
rules to complement the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Procedural rules are generally of two types. The first type be-
stows on litigants their procedural rights in an action. This cate-
gory includes rules specifying (1) the right to seek certain relief
through motion; (2) the right to discovery; (3) the right to implead;
(4) the right to intervene or assert counterclaims; (5) the content
and sufficiency of pleadings; and (6) standards for sanctions. This
category is largely, but not exclusively, the subject of national
rules. The second type of procedural rules simply specifies the or-
der in which the first category of rights is to be exercised. In-
cluded in this category are rules relating to the sequence and tim-
ing for the filing of briefs, discovery deadlines, and time limits for
the filing of third-party claims. The second category is largely, but
not exclusively, the subject of local rules.
A. Benefits of Local Rules
Indeed, local rules play an important role in the federal civil
justice system in that they (1) flesh out the Federal Rules; (2) pro-
vide a degree of certainty as to the governing standards; (3) assure
uniformity of practice throughout the district; and (4) offer an op-
portunity for experimentation and innovation.
1. Fleshing Out the Federal Rules
Local rules may serve to fill in the gaps left by national rules.
The Federal Rules do not, and indeed should not, deal with minu-
tiae, such as the time limits for filing and responding to motions,
the form and content of briefs, the content of final pretrial orders,
and whether the court will entertain oral argument on motions.
By and large, the rules governing these matters turn on local cus-
tom. Because the need for nationwide uniformity is low, perhaps
even non-existent, local rules adequately serve their gap-filling
function.
2. Certainty
Second, local rules provide certainty. When relying on a spe-
cific local rule, litigants and their counsel will know that a motion
40 FED. R. CIrv. P. 83 (providing that "[e]ach district court... may from time to
time... make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent vith these
rules").
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must be made on X days notice with Y days to respond and Z days
to reply. They will also know the local court's numerical limits on
interrogatories or the requirements for the supporting papers for
a summary judgment motion. If the rules are written down,
search time is minimized and the anxiety about the propriety of a
certain course of conduct may be relieved.
3. Uniformity
Third, and closely related to the second point above, local
rules supply uniformity throughout a particular district. The
value of uniformity can best be seen by examining the situation
that would exist were there no local rules. In that situation, all
practices not addressed by the Federal Rules would be determined
by individual judges, and, quite obviously, would vary from cham-
bers to chambers. This state of affairs would be inefficient and
costly. Lawyers would have to acquaint themselves with varying
sets of rules for each case assigned to a different judge. How
would attorneys learn of the individual rules of each judge?
Search costs alone are apt to be steep. Valuable time would be
expended locating and complying with individual judges' rules.
Wholly apart from efficiency concerns, just knowing where to look
is likely to cause problems. If the judge's rules are hard to ascer-
tain, attorneys will have difficulty familiarizing themselves with
them. In turn, the quality of practice before the courts is likely to
decline, while the attorneys' fees rise.
Publication of the judges' rules does not solve the problem.
While having individual judges' rules published may make locat-
ing those rules easier, the lawyer would still be faced with a bewil-
dering array of directives that vary from judge to judge. More-
over, even if rules are published, there are no guarantees that the
practices of the judges will conform to their written rules. This
concern is borne out by the experience of the federal district courts
in the New York metropolitan area. New York is the only city in
the country that houses two federal district courts-the Southern
District and the Eastern District. The New York Law Journal reg-
ularly publishes the individual rules of federal judges in the
Southern District and in the Eastern District. Nevertheless, some
judges choose not to follow the rules as published. Other judges
change their rules without notifying the publisher. These prac-
tices tend to compound the problem of locating and determining
the applicable governing standards.
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This is not to say that uniformity for the sake of uniformity is
a desirable goal or that there is no room for variation in practices
from chambers to chambers. Judges should have leeway to imple-
ment personal preferences in areas where uniformity is not impor-
tant. For example, a judge should be able to decide individually
whether to entertain oral argument on dispositive matters, con-
duct pre-motion conferences, or refer pretrial discovery matters to
magistrate judges. At the same time, it is also clear that there is a
broad area where uniformity would be beneficial to both bench
and bar.
4. Experimentation and Innovation
Fourth, local rules provide district courts with the opportu-
nity to experiment and innovate. Two prominent examples of lo-
cal rules which have gained widespread following are limitations
on the number of interrogatories propounded"' and local rules re-
quiring mandatory pretrial disclosure prior to discovery,42 a proce-
dure that is now part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
under the 1993 Amendments. 43
Litigation is a dynamic process and the rules governing litiga-
tion need to be flexible to keep pace with the demands of an ever-
changing landscape. Obviously, some local rules are experimental
in nature, and not all experimental procedures will prove success-
ful. Local districts, however, can provide a useful testing ground
for rules that can be monitored and subsequently adopted by the
Advisory Committee. For example, the technological advances
that have made videotaping pretrial testimony convenient and
cost-effective have first led local courts,44 and later the Federal
Rules, 45 to ease restrictions on nonstenographic recording of pre-
trial testimony.
41 D. DEL. R. 26.1(b) (50 interrogatories); S.D. CAL. R. 33 (25 interrogatories); D.
IDAso R. 33.1 (40 interrogatories); N.D. IND. R. 14(c) (30 interrogatories).
42 C.D. CAL. R. 6; S.D. FLA. R. 14(a)(1).
43 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (providing for mandatory disclosure "[e]xcept to the extent
otherwise stipulated or directed by order or local rule").
44 See EDNY STANDING ORDER OF THE COURT ON EFFECTIVE DISCOVERY IN CIVIL
CASES No. 7. Standing Order No. 7 states: "Motions in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P.
30(b)(4) for leave to record the deposition of an adverse party or of a non-party witness
by means other than stenographic recording, including tape recording or videotaping,
shall be presumptively granted." Id.
45 FED. R. CIv. P. 32(b)(4).
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B. Criticisms of Local Rules
1. Adoption of Local Rules
Clearly, local rules offer many benefits and have, in fact, pro-
moted good order in the conduct of federal civil litigation. Never-
theless, local rules have been the subject of criticism with respect
not only to their substance but also to the process for their adop-
tion.4 6 The latter problem was addressed by the 1985 amendment
to Rule 83, which attempted to formalize and tighten the process
for adoption and promulgation of local rules.4 v Specifically,
amended Rule 83 requires public notice and an opportunity to
comment before the adoption of local rules so that the district
court may benefit from expert opinions of scholars and practition-
ers before implementation. 48 The amended rule also requires that
local rules be forwarded to the judicial council of the Administra-
tive Office where they are reviewed and collected.49
In theory, formalizing the process of adopting local rules will
promote thoughtfulness in their formulation and filter out those
rules which may unfairly impact on a particular class of litigants.
In reality, the process can be avoided by classifying local rules as
standing orders of the court or by having an individual judge sim-
ply adopt a procedure as a rule of chambers. A standing order is
simply an order of the court that applies in all cases. If all judges
of a court adopt a standing order, it becomes in substance and ef-
fect a local rule, with the Rule 83 safeguards being bypassed.
2. Soundness of Local Rules
The soundness and validity of various local rules have also
been criticized. A detailed study of the more than 5000 local rules,
standing orders, regulations, and other directives governing prac-
tice in the federal system, prepared under the aegis of the Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States and completed in 198950 (the "Local
Rules Project"), revealed, among other things that: (1) some local
46 See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
47 See FED. R. CIv. P. 83 advisory committee note (stating that Rule 83 was
amended to provide for closer scrutiny of local rules "by requiring appropriate public
notice of proposed rules and an opportunity to comment on them").
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 JUDmCIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, Comm!zI. ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PRoJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIvIL PRAC-
TICE (1989) [hereinafter LocAL RULES PROJECT].
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rules were invalid because they were inconsistent with existing
law;5 ' (2) many local rules merely repeated existing law and
should be eliminated;12 (3) some local rules that had become obso-
lete or had otherwise fallen into disuse were still on the books in
some districts;53 and (4) some local rules should be adopted as part
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 4 The Local Rules Project
also identified model local rules and those rules which should re-
main subject to local variations.5 5 In addition, the committee rec-
ognized that local rules are largely a potpourri of directives and
recommendations without any structure and proposed a standard-
ized format for organizing and numbering local rules. 6
3. The Eastern District of New York-A Patchwork of Rules
Perhaps in no place is the patchwork nature of local rules
more evident than in the Eastern District of New York. In that
court, there are no fewer than ten different sets of local rules and
other governing principles that may pertain to a particular civil
action,57 not including individual judges' rules or the plan adopted
pursuant to the CJRA. The situation is complicated by the fact
that some rules are jointly adopted with the Southern District of
New York, while others are not. Even some of the so-called joint
rules are in effect in one district but not the other.58 Furthermore,
there is presently no centralized publication which lists in one
place all the standards, however denominated, that may govern in
a particular case. 9 Accordingly, attorneys can never be truly con-
5' Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 LocAL RuLEs PRojEcr, supra note 50, at 9-14.
56 LoCAL RuLEs PROJECT, supra note 50, at 6-7.
57 See generally UNrED STATES DIST. COURTS FOR THE S. AND E. DIsTs. OF N.Y.,
JoINT RuLEs FOR GENERAL, CIVIL, CrIIIINAL, ADhmRALTY AND MAGISTRATE JUDGE PRO-
CEEDINGS (1983) (compiling rules).
58 SDNY Rule 46, relating to limitations or use of interrogatories, was not
adopted by the Eastern District. EDNY Rule 45, regarding exemptions from
mandatory scheduling orders pursuant to FED. R. Cv. P. 16, is not in effect in the
Southern District.
59 The EDNY Advisory Group is currently addressing this problem in the Eastern
District of New York. The group is preparing a compilation of local rules, standing
orders, practice guidelines and other governing standards, organized by subject mat-
ter, so that practitioners and judges can have before them in one place all procedural
rules governing that action.
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fident that they have consulted all the sources compiling the gov-
erning standards.
This is not to say that the local rules themselves are undesir-
able. Many local rules do expedite litigation. Nevertheless, the
costs of locating the rules and ascertaining the governing stan-
dards may be significant. Potentially high search costs associated
with local rules provide strong support for keeping local rules to a
minimum. Even where the governing rules can be located quickly,
the fact that local rules vary from district to district complicates
federal civil litigation.
C. Effect of the CJRA on Practice
The CJRA presently seeks to stitch onto the patchwork quilt
yet another set of local standards. The new procedures promul-
gated by the CJRA plans are not self-executing. The plans must
be thoroughly studied and understood by bench and bar before
they can have an impact on local practice. As a result, procedural
reform at the local level proceeds at a glacial pace. As became
clear at a conference of Eastern District Judges and Advisory
Group members6" in mid-November 1992, some nine and one-half
months after the plan became effective, attorneys in the Southern
and Eastern Districts of New York have been slow to integrate
procedures into their daily practice. Notwithstanding the best ef-
forts by the judges, the Advisory Group and court personnel to
publicize changes brought about by the plan, magistrate judges,
who are generally responsible for the pretrial phase of most civil
cases in the Eastern District, reported that few attorneys seemed
familiar with the automatic disclosure obligations. At the same
meeting, the ADR Administrator reported that very few cases had
been referred to early neutral evaluation or court-annexed media-
tion pursuant to the plan.61
This lack of familiarity with the plan on the part of litigants
and judges will also make evaluation of the plan, as required by
the CJRA, more difficult. The statute requires an evaluation by
December 1, 1994, less than three years from the effective date of
plans in early implementation districts, and only one year from
60 The author is the Reporter for the Eastern District Advisory Group.
61 At a second feedback conference in June 1993, the ADR Administrator reported
that referrals had increased appreciably, thanks to the cooperation of the judges and
magistrate judges in the District in identifying cases that might benefit from ADR.
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the date that most plans will have become effective. 62 While it
was prudent for Congress to have provided an evaluation mecha-
nism, it is unrealistic to assume that any meaningful conclusion
can be drawn based on one year's experience under the plan.
III. THE CJRA AND THE 1993 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
R ULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
As discussed, plans adopted pursuant to the CJRA have gen-
erated, and will likely continue to generate, confusion in federal
civil litigation. In all likelihood, this confusion will be further
compounded by the promulgation of the 1993 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 1993 Amendments and the
CJRA plans address many of the same issues, thereby creating a
great potential for conflict.
Congress clearly has the power to enact laws affecting prac-
tice and procedure in the federal courts, and the CJRA is unques-
tionably a proper exercise of that power. The real question, how-
ever, is whether Congress should be active in micromanaging an
enterprise that has been traditionally left to the judiciary or
whether the federal civil justice system is better served by relying
on the present mechanism for developing rules governing practice
and procedure in federal courts. The Senate Report accompanying
the CJRA argues for exclusive congressional authority to enact the
reforms contained in the Act.6 3 Relying on Hanna v. Plumer,64 the
Report first stresses congressional power to prescribe rules of
practice and procedure for the federal court systems:
[Tlhe constitutional provision for a federal court system (aug-
mented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it con-
gressional power to make rules governing the practice and plead-
ing in those courts .... [Subsequent cases] cast no doubt on the
long-recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping
rules for the federal courts .... 65
The Report further points out that while Congressional power
is limited by the Constitution,66 the courts' power to regulate fed-
62 28 U.S.C. § 479(a) (Supp. 1992).
63 S. REP. No. 416, supra note 5, at 8-12, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6810-
15.
64 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1964).
65 S. REP. No. 416, supra note 5, at 9, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6812
(quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 472-73).
66 S. REP. No. 416, supra note 5, at 10, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6813.
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eral practice and procedure is limited by the Rules Enabling Act."
The Rules Enabling Act provides that the Supreme Court, in regu-
lating practice and procedure in the federal courts, may not pro-
mulgate rules which "abridge, modify or enlarge any substantive
right."6" The Senate Report asserts that the CJRA does indeed
have substantive goals of improving fairness, efficiency, and ac-
cess to the courts; therefore, only Congress is authorized to enact
the reforms it contains.6 9
This reasoning is of doubtful validity. Every procedural rule
is to some extent designed to improve fairness, efficiency and ac-
cess to the courts.7 ° When procedural rules work well, they have
an incidental effect of encouraging enforcement of substantive
rights. The Supreme Court has held that Federal Rules "which
incidentally affect litigants' substantive rights" do not violate the
Rules Enabling Act.7 1 At most, the CJRA reforms embrace proce-
dures that only incidentally affect substantive rights. In short,
there is no compelling argument to support the view that Congres-
sional involvement in designing housekeeping rules for the federal
courts is constitutionally or statutorily mandated.
Nevertheless, Congress has enacted the CJRA, and the
Supreme Court has promulgated the 1993 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These two regulatory schemes
create a great potential for conflict in a number of areas, includ-
ing: (1) mandatory disclosure; (2) discovery limitations; (3) differ-
ential case management; and (4) alternative dispute resolution.
A. Mandatory Disclosure
Perhaps the most controversial features of the 1993 Amend-
ments are the provisions requiring mandatory disclosure of cer-
tain case information prior to discovery.7 2 The underlying ration-
67 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
68 Id. § 2072(b).
69 S. REP. No. 416, supra note 5, at 12, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6814.
70 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("[The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] shall be con-
strued and administered to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action.").
71 See Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (holding
that Alabama's mandatory cost-shifting statute in state appellate cases has no appli-
cation to judgments entered by federal courts sitting in diversity).
72 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (effective Dec. 1, 1993). The provisions relating to
mandatory disclosure are as follows:
Rule 26. General Provisions Governing Discovery; Duty of Disclosure
(a) Required Disclosures; Methods to Discover Additional Matter.
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(1) Initial Disclosures. Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or di-
rected by order or local rule, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery re-
quest, provide to other parties:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of
each individual likely to have discoverable information relevant to
disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings, identifying
the subjects of the information;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all docu-
ments, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession, cus-
tody, or control of the party that are relevant to disputed facts al-
leged with particularity in the pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclos-
ing party, making available for inspection and copying as under Rule
34 the documents or other evidentiary material, not privileged or pro-
tected from disclosures, on which such computation is based, includ-
ing materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered;
and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agree-
ment under which any person carrying on an insurance business may
be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in
the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy
the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, these disclosures shall
be made at or within 10 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivi-
sion (f). A party shall make its initial disclosures based on the information
then reasonably available to it and is not excused from making its disclo-
sures because it has not fully completed its investigation of the case or be-
cause it challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosure or because
another party has not made its disclosure.
(2) Disclosure of Expert Testimony.
(A) In addition to the disclosures required by paragraph (1), a party
shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be
used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
(B) Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, this dis-
closure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as
an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony,
be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the wit-
ness. The report shall contain a complete statement of all opinions
to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor; the data or other
information considered by the witness in forming the opinions; any
exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions; the
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications au-
thored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensa-
tion to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other
cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by
deposition within the preceding four years.
(C) These disclosures shall be made at the times and in the sequence
directed by the court. In the absence of other directions from the
court or stipulation by the parties, the disclosures shall be made at
least 90 days before the trial date or the date the case is to be ready
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ale of mandatory disclosure is that in most lawsuits there is core
information around which the action revolves and which is nor-
mally well-recognized by the parties. 73 Thus, mandating disclo-
sure without prior request by the adversary, in theory, will make
discovery less of an adversarial contest7 4 and will serve to expe-
dite that phase of the case. 5 In short, the accompanying advisory
committee notes to the mandatory disclosure amendments de-
scribe these provisions as the "functional equivalent of court-or-
dered interrogatories."7 6
Mandatory disclosure has several functions. First, it elimi-
nates the need for parties to request via conventional discovery
that to which they are clearly entitled, thereby reducing cost and
delay at the outset of the action. Second, mandatory disclosure
provides a framework in which additional discovery can be con-
ducted and defines the boundaries of appropriate pretrial inquiry.
Third, mandatory disclosure stresses the lawyer's professional re-
sponsibility as an officer of the court and de-emphasizes the law-
yer's role as advocate of the client's cause, thereby encouraging
cooperation on discovery. Cooperative and collegial discovery will
lessen the incidents of expensive and drawn out discovery
disputes.77
for trial or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut
evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party
under paragraph (2)(B), within 30 days after the disclosure made by
the other party. The parties shall supplement these disclosures
when required under subdivision (e)(1).
Id.
73 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes.
74 See William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Dis-
covery Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 703, 721-24 (1989) (advocating mandatory disclo-
sure and suggesting that adversary process should not apply to pretrial practice);
Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery:A Critique and Proposal
for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1349 (1978) (proposing changes in discovery pro-
cess which would shift counsel's obligation from client to court during discovery, in-
cluding duty to disclose relevant information).
75 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note; see Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of
Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 263, 271 (1992) (speculating that "mandatory
disclosure rules" may reduce amount of discovery and promote early settlement).
76 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note.
77 See Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L.
REv. 1, 17-19 (1985) (indicating that adversary process during pretrial discovery is
prominent factor in high cost of litigation and delays in settlement); see also Brazil,
supra note 74, at 1348 (suggesting that discovery cannot be effective without changes
to environment in which it is conducted).
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Whether these benefits can be achieved in the real world has
been hotly debated,78 and the issue of mandatory disclosure has
spawned many skeptics. In response to criticism levied at public
hearings on the proposed rules in Los Angeles in November 1991
and in Atlanta in February 1992, the Advisory Committee signifi-
cantly narrowed the scope of the disclosure requirement in the
spring of 1992. Time will prove or disprove the wisdom of
mandatory disclosure. In the meantime, a number of districts
have already adopted automatic disclosure requirements at vari-
ance with the 1993 Amendment to Rule 26.' 9 Two examples are
the Southern District of New York and the Eastern District of
New York. In the Eastern District, the CJRA plan, effective Feb-
ruary 1, 1992, calls for automatic disclosure in all cases, excluding
social security, habeas corpus, civil rights cases in which an im-
munity defense is available, government forfeiture cases, and pro
se matters, for an eighteen-month experimental period.8 0 Under
the plan, unless the court orders otherwise, the parties must
disclose:
(a) the identity of all persons with pertinent information respect-
ing claims, defenses and damages;
(b) a general description of all documents in the custody and con-
trol of the parties bearing significantly on claims and defenses;
(c) authorization to obtain medical, hospital, no-fault and work-
er's compensation records;
78 Compare George F. Hritz, Plan Will Increase Cost, Delay Outcomes, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 13, 1993, at 3 (predicting that automatic disclosure will prove costly and ineffi-
cient) and Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Re-
form, 27 GA. L. RaV. 1, 39-48 (1992) (positing that mandatory disclosure will increase
motion practice and overproduce documents of little relevance, thereby increasing liti-
gation costs) and Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Dis-
covery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 820-21 (1991) (questioning
viability of mandatory disclosure) and Laura A. Kaster & Kenneth A. Wittenberg,
Rulemakers Should Be Litigators, NATL L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at 15 (commenting that
mandatory disclosure impinges on work product and attorney/client protections) with
Charles P. Sifton, Experiment a Bold and Thoughtful Step, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 13, 1993, at
3 (noting that automatic disclosure in most cases will make civil discovery less adver-
sarial) and Winter, supra note 75, at 267 (arguing that mandatory disclosure amend-
ments to Rule 26 will reduce costs and delay).
79 Twenty-four of the thirty-five districts with plans in effect as of September 1,
1992 have adopted some form of mandatory or voluntary disclosure. JUDICIAL CoNR-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT REPORT (1992).
80 CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR T=E E. DIST. OF
N.Y. 1 H(A)(1) (1991) [hereinafter EDNY PLAN]. The experimental period has been
extended by the court for an additional twelve months. Id.
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(d) the documents relied on by the parties in preparing the
pleadings or documents that are expected to be used to support
allegations; and
(e) the contents of any insurance agreements.8 '
The operative language of the disclosure in the EDNY plan
varies from the 1993 Amendments. The EDNY plan requires dis-
closure of information "bearing significantly on claims and de-
fenses" and further requires disclosure of all documents relied on
by the parties in preparing the pleadings or documents that are
expected to be used to support allegations."2 In the 1993 Amend-
ments, on the other hand, the operative language is "relevant to
disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings."8 3
Thus, under the 1993 Amendments, the disclosure requirement is
much narrower than the EDNY formulation. The 1993 Amend-
ments effectively place the decision of whether to impose auto-
matic disclosure on the pleader. Specificity in pleading will create
mandatory disclosure obligations; generality in pleading will not.
The Southern District of New York, on the other hand, re-
quires automatic disclosure only in limited circumstances. Under
the differentiated case management system adopted as part of the
Southern District Plan, all cases are channelled to one of three
tracks: complex, standard, or expedited.8 4 Automatic disclosure is
required only in expedited cases.8 5
The mechanics of automatic disclosure in the Southern Dis-
trict remain something of a mystery. The plan itself provides only
that "[i]n cases to be expedited, defined categories of relevant doc-
uments will be produced automatically."8 6 The user's guide to the
Southern District Plan, prepared by the Southern District Advi-
sory Group, provides: 7
1. Expedited Cases-Automatic Disclosure
In any case designated as Expedited by the Court at the
Case Management Conference, within 21 days of filing a com-
plaint a plaintiff must serve on each defendant legible copies of
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
84 CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE S.
DIST. OF N.Y. 2 (1991) [hereinafter SDNY PLAN].
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 GUIDE TO THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CIVIL JUSTICE DELAY AND Ex-
PENSE REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y. 11 (1993) [hereinafter
SDNY GUIDE].
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all documents relevant to the subject matter of the complaint.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Within 21 days of receiving such
material, following designation by the Court, each defendant
must serve on each plaintiff legible copies of all documents rele-
vant to the subject matter of the answer. See FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1). A document is relevant to the subject matter of a plead-
ing if it either (1) supports the material averments of the plead-
ing or (2) contradicts or otherwise makes less probable the mate-
rial averments of the pleading. In any case designated as
Expedited by the court, the parties shall promptly thereafter
carry out the automatic disclosure described above. (Citation
omitted).
After this automatic disclosure by plaintiff and defendant,
the case will be treated as described elsewhere in the Plan.s8
Although the automatic disclosure requirement is limited to
expedited cases, the mandated disclosures are far broader than
those under the 1993 Amendments or under the Eastern District
Plan.
The Southern District adopts a broadly defined "relevant to
the subject matter" standard.s9 The Eastern District requires dis-
closure of all documents relied on in preparing the pleadings and
documents that are expected to be used to support allegations.90
Further, as noted above, a party in the Eastern District must also
disclose "a general description of all documents.., bearing signifi-
cantly on claims and defenses."91 By comparison, the 1993
Amendments, retrenching from earlier proposals, require disclo-
sure of documents relevant to "disputed facts alleged with particu-
larity in the pleadings."9"
Moreover, the timing of the disclosures differ. For example,
under the Southern District Plan, it is contemplated that plaintiff
must make automatic disclosure within twenty-one days of the
designation of the case as expedited by the court.93 The defendant
must make its disclosures within twenty-one days or receiving dis-
closure materials from the plaintiff.94 In the Eastern District,
88 Id.
89 See SDNY GuiDE, supra note 87, at 11.
90 See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
91 See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
92 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
93 See SDNY GUIDE, supra note 87, at 11. In any case designated as expedited,
plaintiff must serve each defendant legible copies of all documents which are relevant
to the complaint within 21 days of filing. Id.
94 Id.
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both plaintiff and defendant must disclose relevant materials
within thirty days of service of an answer.95 Any other party who
has appeared in the case must make disclosures within thirty
days of receiving a written demand from another party.9s The
1993 Amendments provide that disclosures should be made within
ten days after the discovery planning conference held pursuant to
Rule 26(f). 7
The CJRA Model Plan prepared by the Judicial Conference of
the United States,9 s provides that disclosure should be in accord-
ance with amended Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and recommends that approach to district courts.9 9 Assum-
ing the current proposed language [of Rule 26(a)] becomes
effective December 1, 1993, continuity and consistency can be
achieved by adopting that language in the courts' expense and de-
lay reduction plans.1 0
The drafters of the Federal Rules have been cognizant of de-
velopments under the CJRA and the variations in mandatory dis-
closure requirements that currently exist. Amended Rule 26(a)
specifically allows district courts to vary mandatory disclosure re-
quirements or exempt certain classes of cases from mandatory dis-
closure in order to accommodate plans adopted under the
CJRA.101
Authorization of these local variations is, in large measure, in-
cluded in order to accommodate to [sic] the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990, which implicitly directs districts to experiment dur-
ing the study period with differing procedures to reduce the time
and expense of civil litigation. The civil justice delay and ex-
pense reduction plans adopted by the courts under the Act differ
as to the type, form, and timing of disclosures required. Section
105(c)(1) of the Act calls for a report by the Judicial Conference to
Congress by December 31, 1995, comparing experience in twenty
of these courts; and section 105(c)(2)(B) contemplates that some
changes in the Rules may then be needed. While these studies
may indicate the desirability of further changes in Rule 26(a)(1),
95 See EDNY PLAN, supra note 80, 1 II(A)(2).
96 EDNY PLAN, supra note 80, T II(A)(2).
97 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
98 See 28 U.S.C. § 477 (Supp. 1992). The Judicial Conference was given the au-
thority to develop a model civil justice expense and delay reduction plan based on the
plans developed by the early implementation districts. Id.
99 See MODEL PLAN, supra note 26, § 3(I)(A) commentary.
100 MODEL PLAN, supra note 26, § 3(I)(A) commentary.
101 FED. R. Crr. P. 26.
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these changes probably could not become effective before Decem-
ber 1998 at the earliest. In the meantime, the present revision
puts in place a series of disclosure obligations that, unless a court
acts affirmatively to impose other requirements or indeed to re-
ject all such requirements for the present, are designed to elimi-
nate certain discovery, help focus the discovery that is needed,
and facilitate preparation for trial or settlement.1 0 2
The fact that the Advisory Committee anticipated probable
variation from district to district and authorized these variations,
thereby eliminating any technical claims of conflict, is beside the
point. The real problem is that, under the CJRA plans, a variety
of automatic disclosure provisions have come into existence which
conflict with each other and with the 1993 Amendments to Rule
26.103 This has created mass confusion in federal practice, which
has been heightened by the lack of quick access to the plans.
Moreover, the variations in disclosure requirements are likely
to complicate the threshold question of forum selection as between
state and federal courts and as between different federal district
courts. Equally important, there is little, if any, case law on auto-
matic disclosure. For this reason, it is almost impossible to pre-
dict a court's reaction to disputes involving automatic disclosure.
In this regard, the unavailability of resources will once again re-
sult in significant information costs. Whether the information
costs associated with forum selection and related issues are out-
weighed-or even offset-by any concomitant benefits through re-
duction in discovery costs remains unclear.
B. Discovery Limitations
The 1993 Amendments for the first time introduce presump-
tive limitations on the number of depositions and the number of
interrogatories. Depositions are presumptively limited to ten per
side.'04 Interrogatories are presumptively limited to twenty-
102 FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee note.
103 Compare E.D. LA. CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PI, U.S.
DIST. CT. FOR riEE. DIsT. OF LA. (1991), available in 1993 WESTLAW 319595 (follow-
ing mandatory disclosure provisions of Rule 26) and S.D. ILL. CIVIL JUSTICE DELAY
AND REDUCTION PLA-, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE S. DIST. OF ILL. (1991), available in 1991
WESTLAW 525127 (recommending voluntary disclosure) with E.D. Wis. CIVIL JuS-
TICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, U.S. DIsT. CT. FOR THE E. DIsT. OF Wis.
(1991), available in 1991 WESTLAW 525103 (excluding any reference to mandatory
or voluntary disclosure).
104 FED. R. Crv. P. 30. Amended Rule 30 provides in pertinent part:
Rule 30. Depositions Upon Oral Examination
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(a) When Depositions May Be Taken; When Leave Required.
(1) A party may take the testimony of any person, including a party,
by deposition upon oral examination without leave of court except as
provided in paragraph (2). The attendance of witnesses may be com-
pelled by subpoena as provided in Rule 45.
(2) A party must obtain leave of court, which shall be granted to the
extent consistent with the principles stated in Rule 26(b)(2), if the per-
son to be examined is confined in prison or if, without the written stipu-
lation of the parties.
(A) a proposed deposition would result in more than ten deposi-
tions being taken under this rule or Rule 31 by the plaintiffs, or by
the defendants, or by third-party defendants;
(B) the person to be examined already has been deposed in the
case; or
(C) a party seeks to take a deposition before the time specified
in Rule 26(d) unless the notice contains a certification, with support-
ing facts, that the person to be examined is expected to leave the
United States and be unavailable for examination in this country
unless deposed before that time.
(b) Notice of Examination: General Requirements; Method of Record-
ing; Production of Documents and Things; Deposition of Organization; Depo-
sition by Telephone.
(1) A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral
examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other party
to the action. The notice shall state the time and place for taking the
deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if
known, and, if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to
identify the person or the particular class or group to which the person
belongs. If a subpoena duces tecum is to be served on the person to be
examined, the designation of the materials to be produced as set forth in
the subpoena shall be attached to, or included in, the notice.
(2) The party taking the deposition shall state in the notice the
method by which the testimony shall be recorded. Unless the court or-
ders otherwise, it may be recorded by sound, sound-and-visual, or steno-
graphic means, and the party taking the deposition shall bear the cost of
the recording. Any party may arrange for a transcription to be made
from the recording of a deposition taken by nonstenographic means.
(3) With prior notice to the deponent and other parties, any party
may designate another method to record the deponent's testimony in ad-
dition to the method specified by the person taking the deposition. The
additional record or transcript shall be made at that party's expense un-
less the court otherwise orders.
(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a deposition shall be
conducted before an officer appointed or designated under Rule 28 and
shall begin with a statement on the record by the officer that includes
(A) the officer's name and business address; (B) the date, time, and place
of the deposition; (C) the name of the deponent; (D) the administration of
the oath or affirmation to the deponent; and (E) an identification of all
persons present. If the deposition is recorded other than stenographi-
cally, the officer shall repeat items (A) through (C) at the beginning of
each unit of recorded tape or other recording medium. The appearance
or demeanor of deponents or attorneys shall not be distorted through
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five.105
camera or sound-recording techniques. At the end of the deposition, the
officer shall state on the record that the deposition is complete and shall
set forth any stipulations made by counsel concerning the custody of the
transcript or recording and the exhibits, or concerning other pertinent
matters.
(7) The parties may stipulate in writing or the court may upon mo-
tion order that a deposition be taken by telephone or other remote elec-
tronic means. For the purposes of this rule and Rules 28(a), 37(a)(1),
and 37(b)(1), a deposition taken by such means is taken in the district
and at the place where the deponent is to answer questions.
Id.
105 See FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (effective Dec. 1, 1993). Amended Rule 33 provides in
pertinent part:
Rule 33. Interrogatories to Parties
(a) Availability. Without leave of court or written stipulation, any party
may serve upon any other party written interrogatories, not exceeding 25 in
number including all discrete subparts, to be answered by the party served
or, if the party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership or
association or governmental agency, by any officer or agent, who shall fur-
nish such information as is available to the party. Leave to serve additional
interrogatories shall be granted to the extent consistent with the principles
of Rule 26(b)(2). Without leave of court or written stipulation, interrogato-
ries may not be served before the time specified in Rule 26(d).
(b) Answers and Objections.
(1) Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in
writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event the objecting
party shall state the reasons for objection and shall answer to the extent
the interrogatory is not objectionable.
(2) The answers are to be signed by the person making them, and
the objections signed by the attorney n king them.
(3) The party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall
serve a copy of the answers, and objections if any, within 30 days after
the service of the interrogatories. A shorter or longer time may be di-
rected by the court or, in the absence of such an order, agreed to in writ-
ing by the parties subject to Rule 29.
(4) All grounds for an objection to an interrogatory shall be stated
with specificity. Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived
unless the party's failure to object is excused by the court for good cause
shown.
(5) The party submitting the interrogatories may move for an order
under Rule 37(a) with respect to any objection to or other failure to an-
swer an interrogatory.
(c) Scope; Use at Trial. Interrogatories may relate to any matters which
can be inquired into under Rule 26(b)(1), and the answers may be used to the
extent permitted by the rules of evidence.
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable
merely because an answer to the interrogatory involves an opinion or con-
tention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact, but the court may
order that such an interrogatory need not be answered until after designated
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The Eastern District Plan contains a slightly different mecha-
nism for limiting depositions and interrogatories. Under the East-
ern District approach, limitations are to be determined by agree-
ment of the parties and, failing that, by order of the court. 10 6 If
the parties cannot agree and the court does not prescribe limits,
then the Plan presumptively limits depositions to ten per side and
interrogatories to fifteen per side.10 7
The limitations set forth in the 1993 Amendments and in the
Eastern District Plan are not cast in concrete. Nor can it be fairly
said that the limits reflect a judgment with respect to how much
discovery is ordinarily sufficient in a given case. The purpose of
the limitations is to encourage the parties, either together or in
consultation with the court, to map out a cost-effective discovery
plan tailored to the needs of the particular case. 08 In actuality,
the limitations are default provisions-designed to come into play
only when parties cannot agree on, and the court does not order,
the amount of discovery in the case. The presumptive limitations
are obviously inappropriate in complex commercial matters and
complex product liability litigation. They are less significant in
personal injury cases. In all cases, complex and simple, the limi-
tations are designed to encourage cooperation, not to thwart the
prosecution of meritorious claims and defenses.
The Southern District Plan does not address the issue of nu-
merical limitations on depositions and interrogatories directly. It
does, however, appear to contemplate some indirect limitations on
discovery. For instance, the Guide to the Southern District of New
York Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan defines an
expedited case as one "where it is believed that there will be no
more than one or two depositions by each party; where the docu-
ments to be exchanged are clear-cut in nature and relatively small
in volume; [and] where the use of interrogatories will be mini-
mal."10 9 In addition, by local rule, the Southern District limits the
discovery has been completed or until a pre-trial conference or other later
time.
Id.
106 See EDNY PLAN, supra note 80, T II (C)(1).
107 EDNY PLAN, supra note 80, 9 I (C)(1)-(2).
108 FED. R. Civ. P. 30 advisory committee notes (stating that objective of Rule 30
is to entice counsel to develop discovery plan which is mutually cost-effective).
109 See SDNY GuIDE, supra note 87, at 2.
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point in time at which certain types of interrogatories may be
served without a court order.'10
The Judicial Conference's approach in its Model Plan ties dis-
covery limitations to the track to which a particular case is as-
signed."1' It provides:
Upon the filing of each case, the Court will assign the case to one
of six tracks. Each track will carry presumptive discovery limits
as set forth below. These limits shall govern the case and may
not be changed by the parties or their attorneys by agreement or
otherwise. The judicial officer to whom the case is assigned may,
upon good cause shown, expand or limit the discovery.
Track One: No discovery
Track Two: Disclosure only
Track Three: Disclosure plus 15 interrogatories, 15 requests
for admission, depositions of the parties, and
depositions on written questions of custodians
of business records for third parties.
Track Four: Disclosure plus 15 interrogatories, 15 requests
for admission, depositions of the parties, depo-
sitions on written questions of custodians of
business records for third parties, and three
other depositions per side (i.e., per party or per
group of parties with a common interest.)
Track Five: A discovery plan tailored by the judicial officer
to fit the special management needs of the case.
Track Six: Specialized treatment and program as deter-
mined by the judicial officers." 2
Tailoring discovery to meet the needs of a particular case is
unquestionably a worthy goal. Once again, the problem lies in the
variations from district to district. As with mandatory disclosure,
these variations generate additional expense in terms of search
and information costs.
C. Tracking
The CJRA requires advisory groups and courts to consider im-
plementing a system of differentiated case management ("DCM"),
110 SDNY PLAN R. 46(c) ("At the conclusion of each party's discovery, and prior to
the discovery cut-off date, interrogatories... may be served unless the court has
ordered otherwise.").
111 See MODEL PLAN, supra note 26, § 3(I)(D).
112 MODEL PLAN, supra note 26, § 3(I)(D).
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featuring separate litigation tracks for various types of cases. 1 13
The underlying rationale of DCM is that not all civil cases in the
federal system are alike and that the perceived "one size fits all"
approach of the Federal Rules is not the most efficient mechanism
for resolving cases that vary markedly in scope, in factual com-
plexity, and in the degree of legal sophistication. 114
As discussed," 5 the Southern District of New York has devel-
oped a three-tier tracking system: expedited, standard, and com-
plex. "6 The Model Plan has embraced a five-track plan imple-
mented by the Northern District of Ohio." 7 These tracks are as
follows:"18
1. "Expedited" - Cases on the Expedited Track shall be com-
pleted within nine (9) months or less after filing, and shall have a
discovery cut-off no later than one-hundred (100) days after filing
of the [case management plan] ("CMP"). Discovery guidelines for
this track include interrogatories limited to fifteen (15) single-
part questions, no more than one (1) fact witness deposition per
party without prior approval of the Court, and such other discov-
ery, if any, as may be provided for in the CMP.
2. "Standard" - Cases on the Standard Track shall be completed
within fifteen (15) months or less after filing, and shall have a
discovery cut-off no later than two-hundred (200) days after fil-
ing of the CMP. Discovery guidelines for this track include inter-
rogatories limited to thirty-five (35) single-part questions, no
more than three (3) fact witness depositions per party without
prior approval of the Court, and such other discovery, if any, as
may be provided for in the CMP.
113 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1) (Supp. 1993) (requiring district court to consider includ-
ing "systematic differentiated treatment of civil cases" in its cost and delay reduction
plan).
114 See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 5, at 23-24; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historic Perspec-
tive, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 991 (1987) ("[T]here exist substantially different types of
cases that may warrant different processes."); Maurice Rosenberg, The Federal Civil
Rules After Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REV. 243, 243-44 (1984) (suggesting that courts
need not rely on single set of monolithic rules of universal application); Weyma I.
Lundquist & Frank F. Flegal, Discovery Abuse-Some New Views About an Old Prob-
lem, 2 REV. LITIG. 1, 7 (1981) ("Discovery rules in antitrust cases inherently need to be
different than rules for less complex civil litigation.").
115 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
116 See SDNY PLAN, supra note 84, at 3.
117 MODEL PLAN, supra note 26, § 1(I)(D); see DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT
PLAN OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRmCT OF OHIO
(1991), available in 1991 WESTLAW 525119.
118 MODEL PLAN, supra note 26, § I(H)(A).
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3. "Complex" - Cases on the Complex Track shall have the dis-
covery cut-off established in CMP and shall have case completion
goal of no more than twenty-four (24) months.
4. "Administrative" - Cases on the Administrative Track shall
be referred by Court personnel directly to a Magistrate Judge for
a report and recommendation. Discovery guidelines for this
track include no discovery without prior leave of Court, and such
cases shall normally be determined on the pleadings or by
motion.
5. "Mass Torts" - Cases on the Mass Torts Track shall be
treated in accordance with the special management plan adopted
by the Court.11 9
The Model Plan also endorses a six track plan adopted by the
Western District of Michigan, which provides:
120
1. "Super Fast Track" - Voluntary; few legal issues, parties;
agreement to waive trial before Article III judge, forego alterna-
tive dispute resolution ("ADRP), and participate in speedy pre-
discovery disclosure.
2. "Fast Track" - Cases historically concluded in less than nine
months; litigants and legal issues relatively few; ADR use rare;
discovery limited in number of depositions and interrogatories;
case may be assigned to an alternate Article III judge to preserve
the trial date if necessary.
3. "Standard Track" - Cases historically concluded in nine
months to a year; decision on assignment to this track to rest
with judge and litigants; mediation and arbitration frequently
used; summary jury trials rarely used; discovery tailored to the
individual case.
4. "Complex Track" - Cases that historically take more than two
years to resolve; involve complicated legal issues or a large
number of parties; evaluated by a judicial officer and parties to
require extended processing time; will almost always be sub-
jected to range of ADR techniques; discovery tailored to the indi-
vidual case.
5. "fighly Complex Track" - Cases that historically take two or
more years to complete; are exceptionally complex; involve large
numbers of parties, extensive pre-trial motions or proceedings;
includes class actions; a magistrate judge will normally be as-
signed to make reports, recommendations, and assist in resolv-
119 MODEL PLAN, supra note 26, § I(H)(A).
120 MODEL PLAN, supra note 26, § I(II)(A); DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT
PLAN OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MIcHI-
GAN; U.S. DisT. CT. FOR THE W. DIsT. OF MICH. (1992), available in 1991 WESTLAW
525138.
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ing pre-trial and discovery disputes; very few cases will be placed
on this track.
6. "Minimally Managed Track" - Approximately 10% of all cases
will be randomly assigned as a control group for the system; judi-
cial involvement minimal and reactive; extensive pre-trial state-
ments, joint case management orders, or other documentation
are not contemplated; ADR used only on motion or agreement of
the parties; the judicial officer will not be directly involved in su-
pervising discovery or managing trial preparation.' 21
The Eastern District of New York did not adopt a formal
tracking system, but its plan does codify an informal tracking sys-
tem under which social security, habeas corpus, and complex
cases receive special treatment; and all cases involving $100,000
or less are referred to court-annexed arbitration. 122
The 1993 Amendments also do not address the DCM issue.
The Federal Rules leave the management of each case to the indi-
vidual judge assigned.12 Ten years ago, the 1983 Amendments to
the Federal Rules, particularly the changes in Rule 16, were
designed to encourage the assigned judge to take an active role in
managing the docket,124 but the exact degree of hands-on control
was left to the discretion of the individual judge. The 1993
Amendments reinforce this approach. Under proposed rule
16(c)(6), the court at a pretrial conference may consider: "the con-
trol and scheduling of discovery, including orders affecting disclo-
sures and discovery pursuant to Rule 26 and Rules 29 through
37.-125
A program for tracking of cases may be sound in theory, but
in reality, tracking is likely to prove impractical and costly. First,
every case has unique aspects, and the mere fact that the theories
of recovery are the same in two cases does not mean that they
should be treated the same. Second, the single claim complaint is
a rarity, if not an endangered species, in federal practice. Most
complaints contain a variety of claims joined into one action. At-
tempting to assign such multi-claim complaints a track may prove
time-consuming and costly. Disputes between the parties as to
121 MODEL PLAN, supra note 26, § 1(II)(A).
122 See EDNY PLAN, supra note 80, 1 I(A) (choosing not to revise court's existing
system).
123 FED. R. CIv. P. 16(b) (effective Dec. 1, 1993) (giving district judges limited
scheduling and planning authority).
124 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a) (stating that object of Rule 16 is expedition of cases).
125 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(6) (effective Dec. 1, 1993).
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which track is appropriate have already arisen, forcing judicial in-
tervention in a new area and again proving costly. Moreover,
there is at least anecdotal evidence that courts and the parties
have been slow to integrate the tracking system into their pretrial
practice. This evidence supports the contention that tracking is
not a practical tool to address litigation in the federal system.
D. Alternative Dispute Resolution
The CJRA encourages broader use of alternative dispute reso-
lution ("ADR") techniques. 2 6 The CJRA also directs that districts
consider adopting "a neutral evaluation program for the presenta-
tion of the legal and factual basis of a case to a neutral court rep-
resentative selected by the court at a nonbinding conference con-
ducted early in the litigation."' 27
Most plans have followed through on this suggestion and have
attempted to encourage litigants to make greater use of ADR;' 28
for example, the Eastern District of New York has introduced pro-
grams for court-annexed mediation and early neutral evaluation
("ENE") to be administered by the newly-established post of ADR
Coordinator. 29 In addition, all matters involving damages of
$100,000 or less are referred to a pre-existing program of court-
annexed arbitration. 13 ° Unlike court-annexed arbitration, which
is mandatory,' 3 ' court-annexed mediation may be ordered only
upon consent of the parties.13 2 The parties, by consent or at direc-
tion of the court, may also initiate ENE.133
The Southern District has established a two-year program of
court-annexed mediation for all expedited cases and for a sam-
pling of other civil cases.'3  This program applies only to those
cases where money damages are sought, and excludes social se-
curity cases, tax matters, prisoners' civil rights cases, and pro se
126 See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (Supp. 1992) (including court-designated outside
programs, mediation, minitrial, and summary trial).
127 Id. § 473(b)(4).
128 See Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal
Courts, 76 IoWA L. Rv. 889, 914-28 (1991).
129 See EDNY PLAN, supra note 80, $ III(A)-(B).
130 See EDNY PLAN, supra note 80, 91 llI(A)-(B).
131 See EDNY PLAN, supra note 80, M(A)-(B).
132 See EDNY PLAN, supra note 80, 91 lI(A)-(B).
133 See EDNY PLAN, supra note 80, $ Im(A)-(B).
134 SDNY PLAN, supra note 84, at 5.
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matters. 135 The Southern District has also designated a civil case
manager to supervise the mediation process.
136
The Model Plan sets forth a sampling of ADR programs in-
volving court-annexed mediation, ENE, and arbitration.137 It also
proposes additional ADR techniques, including summary jury tri-
als, summary bench trials, minitrials, and settlement weeks with
neutral attorneys.138
The 1993 Amendments do not address ADR. Indeed, very lit-
tle is said in the Federal Rules about ADR, although the Rules
have always provided for some alternative mechanisms for resolv-
ing disputes. 1 9 The 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules au-
thorized courts to consider recommending at pretrial conferences
the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute.140 This
dearth of discussion is not surprising, since the Federal Rules are
intended to address only practices and procedures in federal
courts.
The question is not whether the Federal Rules should address
ADR but whether the Federal Rules should provide the courts
with the same tools that make ADR attractive to many litigants-
limited discovery, summary presentations of evidence, early trial
dates, and prompt decisions. Nevertheless, before ADR is em-
braced as a panacea, we should keep in mind that, although ADR
has been available for many years and ADR techniques have been
employed in many cases, the court backlog has worsened.'
4
'
Moreover, ADR may, in the long run, only add to problems of ex-
pense and delay.
CONCLUSION
The CJRA, by encouraging local experimentation and varia-
tions in federal practice and procedure, has created significant
confusion and uncertainty. Although in theory the procedures
mandated by various plans may in the long run inure to the bene-
fit of all courts in the federal system, the short run costs for the
marginal gains likely to be achieved are simply too high. Reform
135 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 87, at 14-15.
136 SDNY GUIDE, supra note 87, at 15.
137 MODEL PLAN, supra note 26, § 4(I).
138 MODEL PLAN, supra note 26, § 4(I).
139 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (allowing court to appoint special master).
140 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7).
141 See Dayton, supra note 128, at 914-28.
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at the national level rather than at the grassroots is a more sound
and desirable course.

